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Abstract—This article surveys blockchain-based approaches for 
several security services. These services include authentication, 
confidentiality, privacy and access control list (ACL), data and 
resource provenance, and integrity assurance. All these services 
are critical for the current distributed applications, especially due 
to the large amount of data being processed over the networks and 
the use of cloud computing. Authentication ensures that the user 
is who he/she claims to be. Confidentiality guarantees that data 
cannot be read by unauthorized users. Privacy provides the users 
the ability to control who can access their data. Provenance allows 
an efficient tracking of the data and resources along with their 
ownership and utilization over the network. Integrity helps in 
verifying that the data has not been modified or altered. These 
services are currently managed by centralized controllers, for 
example, a certificate authority. Therefore, the services are prone 
to attacks on the centralized controller. On the other hand, 
blockchain is a secured and distributed ledger that can help 
resolve many of the problems with centralization. The objectives 
of this paper are to give insights on the use of security services for 
current applications, to highlight the state of the art techniques 
that are currently used to provide these services, to describe their 
challenges, and to discuss how the blockchain technology can 
resolve these challenges. Further, several blockchain-based 
approaches providing such security services are compared 
thoroughly. Challenges associated with using blockchain-based 
security services are also discussed to spur further research in this 
area. 
Index Terms—blockchains, public key cryptography, 
provenance, data privacy, access control list, integrity assurance, 
blockchain challenges. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A blockchain is a secured, shared and distributed ledger that 
facilitates the process of recording and tracking resources 
without the need of a centralized trusted authority. It allows two 
parties to communicate and exchange resources in a peer-to-
peer network where distributed decisions are made by the 
majority rather than by a single centralized authority. It is 
provably secure against attackers who try to control the system 
by compromising the centralized controller. Resources can be 
tangible (e.g., money, houses, cars, lands) or intangible (e.g. 
copyrights, digital documents, and intellectual property rights). 
In general, anything that has a value can be tracked on a 
blockchain network to reduce its security risks and save the cost 
of security monitoring for all involved [1]. 
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Recently, the blockchain technology has attracted 
tremendous interest from both academia and industry. The 
technology started with Bitcoin, a cryptocurrency that has 
reached a capitalization of 180 billion dollars as of January 
2018 [2] [3]. According to the Gartner report in 2016, the 
blockchain technology is receiving billions of dollars in 
research and enterprise investments and much more is expected 
to come in the near future [4]. The technology currently spans 
several applications that are popular and driving the networking 
research. Such applications include healthcare [5], Internet of 
Things (IoT) [6] [7], and cloud storage [8]. Generally, the 
blockchain technology has proven its potential in any 
application that currently requires a centralized ledger. A 
practical example that employs blockchains is the Interbank 
Information Network provided by JP Morgan which provides 
fast, secured, and cheap international payments [9]. In addition, 
supply chain systems by IBM is exploring the potential of using 
blockchains in their services [10]. 
Among the blockchains’ promising applications are network 
monitoring and security services including authentication, 
confidentiality, privacy, integrity, and provenance. Currently, 
these services are provided by trusted third-party brokers or 
using inefficient distributed approaches. As a result, security is 
a major challenge for current applications. On the other hand, 
the blockchain technology can provide security guarantees that 
resolve many traditional challenges in addition to providing a 
fully distributed, provably secure, and consensus solution. 
Fig. 1 illustrates the differences between the traditional and the 
blockchain-based access control. The same concept can be 
applied to the other security guarantees. 
This survey focuses on the use of the blockchain technology 
to provide network security services and applications. We 
present the use of these services in the current applications, 
discuss the conventional techniques that provide these security 
services, and illustrate their challenges and problems. Then, we 
present how the blockchain technology can be used to resolve 
the associated challenges and highlight several proposed 
blockchain-based approaches that provide the desired security 
services. Finally, we discuss the current challenges faced with 
blockchain and some of the potential future research directions 
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in this field. It should be noted that the details of the blockchain 
technology and how it is used in other domains are out of the 
scope of this paper. We refer the readers to [1] and [2] for more 
details on the blockchain technology. 
A. Related Work 
With the current growing interest in the blockchain 
technology, many new platforms and applications have been 
proposed. Several survey papers have been written to highlight 
the benefits of this technology for the current applications. 
Examples of such surveys include the blockchain technology 
for IoT [7], healthcare [5] and decentralized digital currencies 
[11]. Other surveys have discussed blockchain challenges, 
opportunities, and future visions. For example, the authors in 
[12] discuss the blockchain security issues and challenges. The 
work in [13] presents a thorough survey on blockchain security 
and privacy issues including possible attacks and 
countermeasures. Moreover, a recent special issue of IEEE 
spectrum is dedicated to blockchains and their potential uses 
[14]. 
This paper investigates the use of the blockchain technology 
in a different set of applications with rising interests that have 
not been discussed in the prior surveys. We aim to provide a 
comprehensive survey on the use of the blockchain technology 
in security services. The services can be offered by an enterprise 
and verified globally, offered by an enterprise but not verified, 
or presented as a research work. We strive these services to give 
insights on the current state-of-the-art technology and its 
challenges and discuss how the blockchain technology can be 
used to resolve these challenges. 
B. Security Services and Mechanisms 
According to the X.800 family of standards [15], security 
services can be defined as the services that aid the open system 
interconnection protocols in providing adequate security to the 
transferred data over the system. These services can be divided 
into six categories: authentication, data privacy, data integrity, 
data confidentiality, non-repudiation and data provenance. The 
authentication service includes data origin authentication and 
entity authentication. The mechanisms to achieve this service 
include encryption and digital signature schemes. These 
mechanisms can be provided using public key cryptography, 
which will be explained later in Section III. The data privacy 
service can be achieved by access control mechanisms. The 
data confidentiality service can also be obtained by encryption 
and; therefore, public key cryptography can be used. The data 
integrity service can be achieved by message authentication 
codes using the secret key or the public key cryptography. The 
integrity mechanisms include replicating of the data and 
validating that replicas match. The non-repudiation service 
assures that no one can deny his/her action later and this can be 
provided using digital signature schemes; therefore, public key 
cryptography techniques can be employed. Further, we add the 
data provenance as another service to achieve tracking and 
monitoring of the data or resources. Table I summarizes these 
security services and their associated mechanisms. 
In this paper, we consider the blockchain-based security 
services. Therefore, our discussion will include services such as 
authentication, data privacy, data integrity, and data 
confidentiality. Authentication and confidentiality are both 
provided by the public key cryptography; hence, these two will 
be combined in the same section. Privacy and integrity will be 
discussed in separate sections. It should be noted that non-
repudiation is already provided by blockchain as will be 
explained later in Section II; therefore, we will not consider it 
among the services discussed later in the paper.  
C. Paper Organization 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II gives 
a brief background on the blockchain architecture and its key 
properties and platforms. Section III discusses both the 
traditional and the blockchain-based approaches in providing 
authentication and encryption by public key cryptography and 
key management techniques. Section IV describes both the 
traditional and the blockchain-based approaches to provide 
privacy and access control lists (ACL). Section V presents both 
the traditional and the blockchain-based approaches to provide 
provenance services that track and report the data and resources 
shared in the network. Both the traditional and the blockchain-
based approaches for integrity services to check for correctness 
 
Fig. 1: (a) Traditional centralized access control guarantees 
(b) Blockchain-based access control guarantees 
TABLE I 
SECURITY SERVICES VERSUS SECURITY MECHANISMS 
 Mechanisms 
Services Encryption Digital Signature Message Authentication Code Public key cryptography Access Control Provenance 
Techniques 
Authentication X X  X   
Data Privacy X   X X  
Data Integrity   X    
Data Confidentiality  X   X   
Non-Repudiation  X  X   
Data Provenance      X 
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3 
and reliability of the data are discussed in Section VI. 
Section VII focuses on the challenges currently faced with the 
use of the blockchain technology and their effect on security 
services. Finally, Section VIII summarizes the discussion and 
highlights the main presented points. 
II. BLOCKCHAIN BACKGROUND 
In this section, a brief introduction to the blockchain 
technology is first presented. Following that, mining or block 
construction techniques are explained. The appealing 
characteristics of blockchains are also discussed along with a 
comparison of different open-source blockchain 
implementations. The objective of this section is to introduce 
the readers to the blockchain technology and its key principles. 
A. Blockchain Architecture 
A blockchain consists of a database and a network of nodes, 
as illustrated in Fig. 2. A blockchain database is a shared, 
distributed, fault-tolerant and append-only database that 
maintains the records in blocks. Although the blocks are 
accessible by all the blockchain users, they cannot be deleted or 
altered by them. The blocks are connected to each other in a 
chain as each block has a hash value of its predecessor. Each 
block contains several verified transactions. Also, each block 
includes a timestamp indicating the creation time of that block, 
and a random number (nonce) for cryptographic operations. 
The blockchain network consists of nodes that maintain the 
blockchain in a peer-to-peer, distributed fashion. All nodes 
have access to the blocks, but they cannot completely control 
them. 
 
Fig. 2: Blockchain network, database, blocks, and transactions 
The blockchain technology allows the communicating 
parties to interact in the absence of a trusted third-party. The 
interactions are recorded in the blockchain database providing 
the desired security requirements. When a blockchain user 
needs to interact with another user, it broadcasts its 
“transaction” to the blockchain network. Several nodes in the 
network check if the interactions are valid and construct a new 
block of valid transactions by mining (i.e., combining several 
valid transactions). The making of the blocks will be discussed 
further in the next subsection. If the new block is found valid, 
it is attached to the blockchain database and cannot be deleted 
or altered later. Otherwise, the block is dropped. Both the 
transactions and the blocks are signed; hence, they cannot be 
reverted or denied in the future. 
The blockchain technology has three generations that support 
money transactions, assets, and smart contracts, respectively. 
The first generation was published by Satoshi Nakamoto in 
2009 [1]. The application of this generation was restricted to 
money transactions and was implemented as a part of the 
Bitcoin cryptocurrency, which was the first application utilizing 
the blockchain concept. The second generation of the 
blockchain technology had broader use cases that exchanged 
assets rather than just money. In this generation, users own 
“shares” or “assets” and they can exchange any type of assets, 
including goods, properties and even votes [2]. In the third 
generation of the blockchain, smart contracts were introduced. 
A smart contract is a programmable contract that is checked by 
everyone in the network; thus, it compels both communication 
parties to strictly follow the contracts. The capabilities of 
blockchains were enhanced significantly within the third 
generation which led to its worldwide popularity and an 
increasing interest in its applications for several other critical 
services [6]. 
B. Mining a Block in a Blockchain 
Mining is the process of creating blocks that will be attached 
to the database. In some of the blockchain applications, such as 
in Bitcoin, the miner who creates the first valid block is 
rewarded. This reward is given by the system and is generally 
in terms of money for financial applications. Mining is one of 
the critical concepts in the blockchain technology. It allows 
nodes to create blocks which will be validated by others as well. 
If the new block is found as valid, it is attached to the 
blockchain database. Nodes that try to create blocks are called 
“mining nodes.” The mining nodes race to validate the 
transactions and create a new block as fast as they can to win 
the reward. 
Several approaches exist to decide which miner wins, 
including proof of work (PoW) [16], proof of Stake (PoS) [17], 
Proof of Space (PoSpace) [18], Proof of Importance (PoI) [19], 
Measure of Trust (MoT) [20], minimum block hash [21], and 
Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) [22]. In the 
following, we summarize these major mining approaches (see 
also Table II). 
• Proof of Work: PoW is the mining technique used in Bitcoin 
and is currently used by many other blockchain technologies. 
It requires the mining nodes to solve a hard-mathematical 
puzzle that is changed frequently and has been agreed by all 
the miners. Once a node validates the transactions and solves 
the puzzle, the block is submitted to the blockchain network. 
Other mining nodes validate the block to make sure that the 
submitter is not falsifying. Once it is agreed among the miners 
that the block is legit, it will be added to the blockchain and 
the submitter will be rewarded. The agreement here is based 
on a majority consensus. Thus, it is difficult to fake unless the 
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4 
attackers compromise more than 50 percent of the mining 
nodes. The problem with this approach is that high 
computational power is wasted in solving the mathematical 
puzzle [16]. 
• Proof of Stake: Unlike PoW, PoS does not require the 
mining nodes to solve a computationally expensive 
mathematical puzzle. Instead, the next block creator or miner 
is chosen in a pseudo-random way. The chance of a node 
being chosen to create the new block depends on the node’s 
wealth or stake. In other words, the more money a node has, 
the higher its chances to mine a block. The native version of 
PoS does not award the miner; however, the extended 
versions award and punish the creators based on their 
performance. Selection based on the wealthiest account may 
result in a single account handling all the creations; hence, it 
may lead to an unfair distribution or even centralization. 
Therefore, a randomized node selection and a coin age-based 
selection have been proposed. In coin age-based method, the 
users that have not created any block for the past 30 days are 
considered for mining [17]. 
• Proof of Space: PoSpace is similar to PoW except that the 
puzzle requires a lot of storage. A miner proves its ability to 
create a new block by allocating the required storage space 
to perform mining. In other words, instead of having a high 
computational capability, the mining node needs to have a 
high storage capability. Several theoretical and practical 
implementations of PoSpace have been released; however, 
the required high memory space is a challenge similar to the 
computation challenge of PoW [18]. 
• Proof of Importance: PoI is a mining technique that 
calculates the significance of an individual node based on the 
transaction amount and the balance of that node. It assigns a 
priority with a hash calculation to the more significant nodes. 
Further, the node with the highest priority is chosen for the 
next block creation [19]. 
• Measure of Trust: Another way to perform mining is to use 
dynamic trust measurements and select the node with the 
highest trust level as the block initiator [20]. The 
trustworthiness is based on the nodes’ behaviors; therefore, 
good behaving nodes that follow the protocols are rewarded. 
More specifically, the trustworthiness could be formulated as 
the expected value of the node’s behavior in the future. This, 
the trustworthiness is approximated by the history of good 
and bad actions that the node has taken so far. The MoT 
approach could be subject to malicious attacks if a specific 
node plans to increase its trustworthiness for several 
iterations in order to attack the network later. The authors in 
[20] proposed several mechanisms to handle such attacks. 
• Minimum Block Hash: In [21], the authors proposed an 
approach for mining where the miner is chosen randomly and 
not based on its resources. The system selects the miners 
based on a generated minimum hash value across the entire 
network. Thus, the selection of the next miner is randomized 
and the probability of selecting the same miner is low. This 
approach was implemented on a modified Bitcoin network 
and it was shown to offer energy savings for mining. 
However, it has not been adopted by the Bitcoin community. 
• Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance: Unlike others, PBFT 
[22] is a consensus approach that does not include any type 
of resources but utilizes the blockchain consensus based on 
the Byzantine fault tolerance approach. In this approach, 
first, a leader is selected and agreed among the nodes. The 
leader decides on the transactions’ validation and publishes a 
block to all the nodes in the blockchain network. A 
transaction is committed to a new block only if two-thirds of 
the mining nodes verify its correctness. The leader changes 
frequently; therefore, the approach is not considered as 
centralized. PBFT has been shown to be faster than other 
methods; however, it suffers from scalability issues due to 
the resulting communication overhead as discussed in [23]. 
C. Key Properties of Blockchains 
Key properties of the blockchain technology include their 
distributed nature, decentralized consensus, trustless system, 
cryptographic security, and non-repudiation guarantees. In 
Table III, we briefly summarize these properties and the 
problems they try to solve. 
TABLE III 
KEY PROPERTIES OF BLOCKHAINS 
Property Problem to be solved  Blockchains’ solution 
Distributed 
Nature 
Current applications are 
distributed by nature, 
therefore, require 
distributed control and 
security mechanisms. 
Most of the current 
practical security 
solutions are centralized 
and inefficient for these 
applications. 
The blockchains are 
distributed by nature. 
Thus, blockchain-based 
security services can be 
implemented in a 
distributed fashion  
Decentralized 
Consensus 
Centralized decisions by 
one controller can make 
the controller a single 
point of failure.  
The blockchain 
decisions are achieved 
by decentralized 
consensus, majority 
votes, and nodes 
agreement. 
TABLE II 
COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT MINING TECHNIQUES 
Mining 
approach 
Resources 
needed Randomness Implementations 
Reward 
miner? 
POW 
High 
computation 
power 
No 
randomness Bitcoin  Yes  
PoS Wealth or stake 
Randomized 
blockchain 
selection 
Ethereum No 
PoSpace High memory  No randomness Permacoin  Yes 
PoI Node significance 
No 
randomness NEM Yes 
MoT Trustworthiness No randomness 
Not 
implemented 
Yes 
(trust) 
Minimum 
block 
hash 
None 
Randomized 
blockchain 
selection 
Bitcoin 
extension Yes 
PBFT None No randomness Hyperledger  No 
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5 
Trustless System Security provided by 
third parties can impose 
security and privacy risks 
if the party is 
compromised  
The blockchain 
technology imposes a 
trust of majority votes, 
which is impenetrable to 
compromise unless 
attackers have control 
over the entire system. 
Cryptographic 
Security 
Algorithms for security 
should prove that they 
are supremely difficult to 
break. 
The blockchains use 
elliptic curve 
cryptography that is 
difficult to break. 
Further, the trustless 
system and the 
decentralized consensus 
make it even more 
difficult to break. 
Non-repudiation 
Guarantee 
Users can deny their 
interactions in the system 
The blockchains use 
signatures of 
transactions and blocks 
in addition to permanent 
databases such that 
transactions cannot be 
denied later. 
D. Blockchain Open-Source Implementations 
As there are many open-source implementations of the 
blockchain technology, the choice of which implementation to 
use is challenging. In Table IV, we compare different aspects 
of several popular blockchain implementations. We will be 
referring to these implementations throughout this paper when 
we discuss the blockchain-based security services. It is 
important to keep these features in mind to highlight the 
properties of each implementation. It should be noted that these 
are not the only implementations and many others exist in the 
literature. However, these are the most popular ones used in the 
majority of the blockchain applications. 
TABLE IV 
OPEN-SOURCE IMPLEMENTATIONS OF BLOCKCHAINS 
COMPARISON 
Platform Smart 
contract 
Mining Advantages Disadvantages 
Bitcoin [25] No POW • Scalable 
in terms of 
the number 
of nodes 
and users. 
• Currently 
most 
popular  
• Computationally 
expensive. 
• Time 
consuming  
Ethereum 
[26] 
Yes POW 
or PoS 
• Scalable  
• For PoS 
mining,  
no 
computation 
is required.  
• Require stake or 
wealth to be 
selected for mining  
HyperLedger 
[27] 
Yes PBFT • No 
minting and 
thus faster 
than all 
others 
(promised) 
• Scalability 
problem. Does not 
scale above 20 
nodes as reported 
in [24] 
E. Summary 
A blockchain is a distributed, shared, append-only, and 
permanent database that was first utilized by Bitcoin for 
cryptocurrency applications. Its key properties include 
distributed nature, consensus, trustless system, cryptographic 
security and non-repudiation guarantees. These properties make 
the blockchain technology a potential approach for the current 
distributed applications including IoT, healthcare, and 
automated supply chains. Several variations of the blockchain 
technology exist in the literature to solve the challenges 
introduced in the first generation. One of the critical challenges 
in Bitcoin mining is the computational capability that is 
required to perform mining. Alternatives to PoW mining 
include: PoS, PoSpace, PoI, MoT, minimum block hash, and 
BPFT. These alternatives resulted in many open-source 
blockchain platforms that developers can choose depending on 
the application. In the remainder of this paper, we assume that 
the reader has the knowledge of the discussed platforms and 
their variations, as well as the advantages, and disadvantages of 
each. 
III.  ENCRYPTION AND THE AUTHENTICATION SERVICES 
Encryption and authentication are two of the most important 
security services that must be provided in any network system. 
In general, these services can be granted using public key 
cryptography as one of the well-known security frameworks. 
The public key cryptography techniques require the entities to 
have private and public information. They need an 
infrastructure to create, revoke, manage, distribute, use, and 
store the generated keys or the generated information. In this 
section, the public key cryptography and its uses in today’s 
applications are first discussed. Following that, an introduction 
to the public key management techniques and their challenges 
are presented. Then, an overview of how the blockchains can 
be used to solve these challenges and some blockchain-based 
key management techniques are discussed and compared.  
A. Public Key Cryptography and Its Services 
Public key cryptography, also known as asymmetric 
cryptography, is a cryptographic technique that uses a pair of 
keys: public keys which are distributed over the system and 
private keys which are kept secret. It was introduced initially by 
Diffie and Hellman in 1975 and is still widely adopted. The 
basic idea is to use one of the keys to do a task (encryption or 
signature) and use the other key to do the reverse of that task 
(decryption or validation). In this way, every entity can verify 
the message coming from a certain user by the user’s public 
key. The reply message can also be encrypted before sending it 
back. Only that specific user can sign/decrypt the message with 
its private key. 
The public key cryptography can be used for many security 
services including the entity authentication and the 
confidentiality. As illustrated in Fig. 3, the entity authentication 
service can be provided by the signature/verification procedure. 
An entity sends a message signed with its private key and 
everyone can verify/authenticate that entity by validating the 
signature with the entity’s public key. Since the private key is 
kept confidential, no one can sign the message except the entity 
itself or someone who has access to the private key. On the 
other hand, the verification is done with the public keys. Thus, 
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6 
everyone with the user’s public information can verify and 
authenticate that user.  
The confidentiality service can be achieved by 
encryption/decryption, which is a similar procedure. The 
encryption is done by the sender with the receiver’s public key. 
The decryption is done by the receiver with his private key. 
Only the receiver, or someone who has the receiver’s private 
key, will be able to decrypt and understand the data. Therefore, 
the confidentiality is guaranteed. 
 
Fig. 3: Illustration of public key services  
B. Services’ Importance for the Current Applications 
Entity authentication and message confidentiality are the 
most critical services in almost all of the current network 
applications. A smart healthcare environment is a typical 
example of the importance of these services. The system is 
required to secure the transmitted data in order to keep patients’ 
privacy from intruders. Further, it is crucial to authenticate the 
right doctor, the hospital and the pharmacy and secure their 
access to the data. 
To generate the private/public keys for the system, many 
algorithms have been proposed, including RSA [28], ElGamal 
[29], and elliptic curve [30]. Discussing these algorithms is out 
of the scope of this paper. However, in general, these are 
complex and need an infrastructure to generate and manage the 
public/private keys. The certificate authorities (CA), the web of 
trust (WoT) and the entity-based cryptosystem have been 
introduced to create, manage, use, store, and distribute the keys. 
In the following subsections, we discuss both the traditional and 
the blockchain-based key management approaches, including 
CA and the web of trust. In a later subsection, we discuss the 
entity-based cryptosystem which is the current trend that 
extends the CA mechanisms to make a better use of the public 
key cryptography. 
C. Key Management by the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 
The public key infrastructure (PKI) is one way to provide the 
key management for the public key cryptography. 
Traditionally, there are two conventional approaches to achieve 
PKI, centralized by a CA and decentralized by WoT. The CA-
based PKI is the most commonly used approach and it has been 
standardized in the X.509 standard [31]. In this approach, the 
CA is a third-party entity that is trusted by all members in the 
system. The CA issues “certificates,” which authenticate users 
and bind each user to a public key. A signed certificate, binding 
a user to its public key, will authenticate the ownership of that 
public key to that specific user. The other traditional approach 
is WoT, which was proposed in 1992 by Phil Zimmerman. This 
technique utilizes a decentralized approach in which the keys 
are generated locally and will be trusted if they are verified by 
at least one other trusted user in the system [32]. 
D. Problems with the Traditional PKI Systems 
Both of the traditional techniques suffer from several 
challenges which are discussed in this subsection. 
The CA-based PKI comes with three major challenges: a 
trusted third party, a single-point-of-failure, and cost. The users 
of the systems must trust the CA in generating and managing 
their public keys which imposes high-security risks if the CA is 
compromised. This architecture has a single point of failure as 
the whole system fails if the CA fails. Furthermore, the 
management of the public keys by one centralized CA can be 
both expensive and inefficient, especially with the current 
massively distributed applications where a large number of 
users are involved [33]. 
On the other hand, in the WoT-based PKI, the signers need 
to build trustworthiness. The users join the network only if they 
are trusted by another “trusted” member. In other words, new 
members joining the network need to build prior trust with other 
members who are already in the system. This can lead to a 
barrier for new members entering the network [33]. 
Moreover, both the CA-based and the WoT-based PKI are 
unable to provide identity retention. That is, it is possible for a 
user to impersonate the identity or the public key of an already 
registered user. Some proposals have been offered to solve this 
problem; however, they are mostly log-based, which could be 
highly complex, especially in the case of the worldwide 
distribution of the users [33]. 
E. Blockchain-Based PKI Concept 
The distributed, the event-recording and non-reproducibility 
features of the blockchain technology make it a desirable 
technique for several applications. Particularly, these properties 
prove the blockchains’ suitability for PKI and domain name 
services (DNS). Since the blockchain-based PKI solutions are 
distributed; they have no centralized point of failure. The trust 
is built based on the majority vote of the miners; hence, there is 
no single trusted third-party and it does not require prior 
trustworthiness in the system. More importantly, the blockchain 
technology has several open-source implementations, which 
helps build cost-effective and efficient solutions. The problems 
with the traditional approaches and how the blockchains can 
solve them is summarized in Table V.  
In the following, we discuss several approaches to achieve 
blockchain-based PKI. 
1) Instant Karma PKI (IKP) 
The Instant Karma PKI (IKP) framework extends the 
traditional CA approach by recording the CA behavior to the 
blockchain database. In this way, misbehaving or compromised 
CAs can be detected by the network and a riposte must happen. 
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7 
The event recording feature of the blockchains facilitates the 
CA tracking and monitoring by the blockchain users and helps 
detect the misbehaving CAs. This approach can reduce the trust 
problem in the traditional CA-based algorithm as eventually 
misbehaving CA can be detected.  
IKP is a research work that was proposed in 2017 and 
verified in terms of cost saving and distribution. An open source 
implementation was also promised but has not come available 
at the time of this writing [34]. However, having a CA in the 
system still lead to a single point of failure system. Trying to 
solve this matter by having several CAs imposes cost; thus, 
leading to even a more expensive solution. 
2) Pemcor 
Pemcor utilizes the blockchain database as a distributed and 
secure data store [35]. The idea is to let the CA issue a 
certificate which is not signed. Instead, the hash value of the 
certificate is stored in the blockchain which is controlled by 
authorities, like by banks or governments. Such authorities 
share two blockchain databases, one for the generated 
certificates and one for the revoked certificates. When 
verifying, the authority checks its maintained blockchain data 
stores. If the hash of the certificate exists in the generated 
certificate blockchain and is not in the revoked certificates 
blockchain, the certificate is valid; otherwise, it is not. This idea 
is simple and provides several advantages such as an easy 
verification with low delay guarantees. 
Pemcor is part of a project that aims to find a solution for 
identity proofing and replaces the traditional knowledge-based 
verification. The project was proposed and documented 
theoretically by several white papers in 2016, however, it still 
lacks the complete implementation and the evaluation of the 
system. Given other approaches presented in this section, this 
work is not expected to contribute further to the blockchain-
based PKI systems. 
3) Gan’s Approach 
In [36], the authors propose a key-based authentication 
system dedicated to the IoT environments. The idea is to use a 
private blockchain for storing the nodes’ latest public keys, 
validating the keys, and allowing others to request the nodes’ 
keys. The architecture of this approach is illustrated in Fig. 4, 
where a Centralized CA (CCA) is assumed to be fully secured. 
Several validators, donated as Device Manufacturer Validators 
(DMVs), are connected to the CCA. 
 
Fig. 4: The architecture of Gan’s approach 
The DMVs are hosted by the IoT manufacturers and they are 
required to have the computational capabilities to generate the 
public/private keys, to perform mining and to maintain the 
blockchain database. The IoT devices are connected to these 
validators and are assumed to be simple without any 
computational capability. Initially, a DMV joins the blockchain 
network by requesting the CCA to authenticate it. The CCA 
validates the DMV and constructs a transaction that contains 
the DMV public key, the validator address, and the CCA’s 
signature. The transaction is submitted to the blockchain and 
the DMV is now known to the others. Accordingly, the DMV 
can add a new IoT node by submitting a transaction containing 
the node’s public key and address to the blockchain. 
Furthermore, the DMVs can update or revoke their IoT devices’ 
public keys by submitting transactions.  
This work has an open-source implementation that is 
available on GitHub and referenced in [36]. The 
implementation utilizes Network Simulator version 3 (NS3) to 
build and evaluate their proposed approach. Even though the 
approach was initially applied to the IoT platforms, the idea can 
be implemented in any other networking applications including 
sensor networks, health care, or even micro clouds platforms. 
It should be noted that these previously discussed three 
approaches use the blockchains only as distributed databases to 
share and validate the keys. In other words, they do not benefit 
from the other important properties of the blockchains 
including the distributed consensus and the non-repudiation 
guarantees. In addition, as it was mentioned before, having a 
CA that generates the keys does not resolve the problems of 
centralization; hence, the single point of failure in the 
traditional PKI approaches. 
4) Distributed PKI (DPKI) 
In [37], the authors sketch the principles of an appropriate 
blockchain-based PKI, which is referred to as Distributed PKI 
(DPKI). The DPKI uses the blockchain technology as a 
TABLE V 
THE TRADITIONAL PKI PROBLEMS AND THE BLOCKCHAIN-
BASED SOLUTIONS 
The traditional 
approach 
The problem The blockchains solution 
CA-based PKI Third party trust 
Single point of failure  
Cost of deployment 
The distributed consensus 
property of blockchains 
No centralized authority 
Open source 
implementations 
WoT-based PKI Prior trustworthiness Does not require any 
previous trust. The 
decisions are made based 
on majority votes 
CA-based and 
WoT-based PKI 
Identity retention The technology has an 
event recording database 
and it thus can verify if the 
public key has been 
registered before or not 
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distributed, trustless database that eliminates the need for a CA 
and gives the users the direct control and ownership of their 
data. This work uses a web registration domain, where the user 
spawns its public/private key and submits the public key to the 
blockchain network as a transaction. In this work, it is claimed 
that the blockchain technology can resolve the traditional 
problems and protects the network against man in the middle 
attacks. This protection is granted by linking the most recent 
key of the user to his/her identity. 
The paper did not include any implementation-related 
aspects; nevertheless, it introduced the possibility of 
blockchain-based PKI, which was later implemented in many 
other works as will be discussed next. 
5) Blockstack 
Blockstack ID is an appropriate blockchain-based approach 
that uses Namecoin to build a distributed PKI system. 
Namecoin, [39], is a fork of Bitcoin that allows data storage 
within the blockchain transactions. It is implemented by 
defining a name-value pair that is used to store usernames and 
can be recorded in the transactions. Namecoin was originated 
to store the DNS names, allowing users to register their human-
readable name and associating names with the corresponding 
public keys. 
Blockstack ID modifies Namecoin by adding another name-
value pair dedicated for the public keys. The advantage of using 
Namecoin is that it already supports the name-value pairs in its 
transactions. Thus, the public key is the value and the name is 
the identity of the owner. Blockstack implementation binds the 
user identity to an elliptic curve public key which is one of the 
strongest public key cryptography mechanisms to date. 
Blockstack was released as an open-source software in 2014 
and is currently serving as a PKI system for 55,000 users. It is 
probably the most popular blockchain-based PKI among other 
techniques discussed in this section. However, some issues such 
as how the system would handle the public key updates, the 
lookups, and the revocations have not been considered in 
Blockstack. Also, the identity retention problem is not been 
resolved. 
6) Certcoin 
Certcoin, [40], is another fully decentralized PKI that relies 
on Namecoin to build its platform. Unlike Blockstack ID, this 
platform provides the identity retention guarantee. As in the 
traditional PKI approaches, this system is composed of 5 
functions: registration, update, lookup, verification and 
revocation. During the registration, the owner originates its own 
private and public keys locally. It keeps the private key to itself 
and submits a transaction of the public key and its signature to 
the blockchain. The blockchain network verifies the transaction 
signature and the fact that this ownership was not registered 
before in the system. If the verification is successful, the (ID-
public key) tuple is added to the blockchain; otherwise, it is 
dropped. To update the public key, the owner submits a 
transaction containing the identity along with the previous 
public key, the new public key, and the signature. Miners need 
to verify that the signature is correct, the identity exists in the 
blockchain, and it is associated with the previous public key. 
Then the mined blocks are broadcasted to the network to be 
verified. The verification follows a similar process where the 
owner submits a transaction requesting the blockchain network 
to verify the key which can be done by the miners and other 
blockchain nodes. 
Certcoin has 3 versions, numbered 0, 1, and 2. The first 
version (version 0) required complex computations and 
operations while the second and the third versions tried to 
reduce this complexity by accelerating the blockchain 
processing. Version 0 had all the five functions submitted and 
mined by the blockchain network as in Bitcoin. However, those 
functions are complex and result in a computationally 
expensive process. Thus, versions 1 and 2 tried to reduce this 
complexity by a cryptographic accumulator and a distributed 
hash table, respectively. A cryptographic accumulator is a 
space-efficient data structure that is used to reduce the time and 
the complexity of the verification process [41]. A distributed 
hash table supports fast look-ups for the public key queries; 
hence, the complexity of the lookup and the verification is 
reduced [42]. Therefore, the verification, the lookup and the 
update functions have been simplified in both versions 1 and 2. 
Similar to Blockstack, Certcoin is an open-source 
implementation that was first released in 2014. The project was 
one of the first blockchain-based PKI and is offered by MIT 
[40]. However, Certcoin is less popular compared to Blockstack 
due to the lack of proper documentations and the lack of updates 
to the software. 
7) Guardtime Solution 
Guardtime provides another solution for secure 
authentications of the IoT devices using the blockchains and 
physically unclonable functions (PUFs). A PUF is a digital 
fingerprint hardware that serves as a unique identifier of the 
devices. The PUFs use the unique characteristics of each device 
to generate its unique private/public keys. Guardtime employs 
PUFs to generate the public/private keys. The public keys are 
submitted to the blockchain in transactions. IoT devices have 
limited memory; hence, they cannot store large private/public 
keys [43]. In other words, the solution provided by PUF and 
Guardtime helps such devices regenerating the same key each 
time it is needed.  
Guardtime is an enterprise that currently offers blockchain-
based solutions for several industries including the insurance 
companies, the physical supply chains, the cloud providers, and 
many others. Guardtime Federal is a fork from Guardtime that 
started in 2014 and is dedicated to providing cyber-security 
solutions for the US department of Defense, the U.S. 
Intelligence Community, and other U.S. Government 
departments. All solutions offer the confidentiality and 
authentication services. However, these solutions are mainly 
dedicated to supply chains and their integrity assurance, as will 
be discussed in Section VI-E. 
8) Blockchain-Based Trust and Authentication for 
Decentralized Sensor Networks 
Moinet at al., [44], propose an approach of using the 
blockchain technology as a database to store the public keys, 
the digital signatures and some peers’ information in a wireless 
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sensor network. This approach is similar to Certcoin, since it 
allows the nodes to verify and authenticate each other using the 
blockchain network. Initially, when a node wants to join the 
network, it submits a credential transaction, or a credential 
payload as referred in the paper. This transaction has the master 
public key and a signed hash value that is used to authenticate 
the node. A node can submit a transaction to renew or revoke 
its own public key. In addition, this approach introduces a 
“blame transaction” which defines the trust level of all nodes in 
the network. A node is blamed whenever its trustworthiness 
goes below a certain defined level. The blame transaction 
includes the node that generated the blame, the blamed node 
and the block that had the node ID and the public key included. 
Furthermore, all the blocks must have a miner’s approval 
transaction to be valid. A miner’s approval transaction would 
include the miner ID, a nonce, the new node’s public key, and 
the signature of the miner. 
It should be noted that this approach is an extension of the 
web of trust traditional approach, where a node can join the 
network only if another node (miner) approves it. Also, this is 
mainly a research work that does not include any proper 
blockchain implementation, thus, is not getting practical and 
popular compared to Blockstack or Certcoin. 
F. Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC) 
Recently, identity-based cryptography (IBC) has gained 
interest in the network security community. IBC is a public key 
mechanism that uses the node’s ID as the public key rather than 
generating the traditional lengthy public keys. A node’s ID can 
be the node’s name or any arbitrary string that can be used as 
the public key. The encryption approach, as depicted in Fig. 5, 
consists of four phases: setup, extract, encrypt, and decrypt. 
 
Fig. 5: Identify-based encryption phases 
In the setup phase, a private key generator (PKG) generates 
a master secret key along with some public system parameters. 
The secret key is kept private while the system parameters are 
made public. To extract the keys, the generator uses the system 
parameter in addition to its master secret key and the user’s ID. 
These parameters are used to construct a secret key which is 
sent back to the user. For other nodes to encrypt a message, they 
use the ID and the public parameters to generate a ciphertext. 
The user uses its own private key to decrypt the message. A 
similar approach is used for the signature and the verification, 
where the signature is generated with the node’s secret key 
while the verification is done with the node’s ID and the public 
system parameters [45]. 
A generalization of the IBC is to build a Hierarchal IBC 
(HIBC) where the public key has a hierarchal identity basis that 
can be represented by a tree. For example, the public key of 
Alice at organization X is Alice@X rather than Alice. The 
encryption phases of HIBC are the same as the four phases in 
the IBC with an additional phase, called delegation. This phase 
allows an entity to generate secret keys for its children. In other 
words, the system needs one PKG to generate the secret key for 
the root. Others secret key can be driven from that key [46]. 
G. Problems with the Current IBC-Based Approaches 
The problem with both the IBC and the HIBC approaches 
is that they require the PKG to generate the private keys. 
Therefore, the system is centralized which makes it a single 
point of failure and imposes a third-party trust requirement. It 
is centralized as the PKG is the only authority that can generate 
key pairs. If the PKG is compromised, the whole system is 
compromised. In other words, the IBC and the HIBC have the 
same limitation as the CA-based PKI traditional approach. 
Moreover, the PKG generates the users’ private keys; hence, all 
the users should trust the PKG not to misuse their private keys.  
H. Blockchain-Based IBC 
Similar to the blockchain-based PKI approaches, the 
blockchain technology can be used as a distributed database to 
resolve the problems of the traditional IBC approaches. Since, 
the blockchain technology has a decentralized database, it 
solves the problems of centralization and the single point of 
failure. It does not require a third-party trust as the users can 
generate their own master keys. However, if a user has limited 
resources and cannot generate its own key, it can delegate that 
to any other node that it trusts. 
The basis of the blockchain-based IBC systems is to let the 
users generate their own keys. This indicates that the setup and 
the extract phases are done at the user level. Then, the public 
parameters are submitted to the blockchain as a transaction. The 
blockchain nodes check whether these parameters are valid and 
they have not been used before. Any user can later query the 
blockchain network for other users’ public parameters which 
are used to authenticate the user and encrypt the confidential 
messages. 
1) Blockchain-Based IBE for Information-Centric 
Networking (ICN) 
The blockchain-based IBC can be applied to secure the 
Information-Centric Networking (ICN) which considers 
“content names” as the main element for security, i.e., as the 
basis for inter-network communication. Therefore, it is 
practical to utilize the HIBC approach to secure the ICN, as the 
contents are designed to be hierarchical [46]. In [47], the 
authors utilize the blockchain-based IBC to provide distributed 
security for the ICN networks, where a content owner wishes to 
share some data with the subscribers. This approach consists of 
two phases: setup and retrieval. In the setup phase, the owner 
generates the public parameters and a secret key that are 
required by the HIBC. In other words, the owner acts as a PKG 
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for itself. It registers the public parameters to the blockchain 
network by submitting a new transaction. Then, when a 
subscriber wants to access the data, it queries the network for 
the public parameters of the corresponding content. This means 
that instead of consulting the centralized PKG in the traditional 
HIBC algorithm, the subscriber consults the distributed 
blockchain. These activities are recorded in the transactions; 
hence, cannot be denied once the transactions are committed to 
the blockchain database. Thus, the blockchain technology can 
provide both the integrity and the provenance services, in 
addition to solving the centralized architecture challenges. 
This scheme can be applied to any ICN or other similar 
applications. However, the initial implementations of this 
scheme showed a high level of complexity in generating the 
public keys. This problem resulted in restricting the scheme’s 
practicality and popularity among the resource-limited ICN 
applications that are emerging. 
I. Summary 
The public key cryptography is an important security 
framework that is used widely to provide the authentication and 
the confidentiality services. Such services are critical for most 
of the current applications including IoT and healthcare. A 
management system is required to provide a proper 
infrastructure for such services. PKI is a framework to generate, 
distribute and manage public keys for the entities in the system. 
In this section, we discussed the traditional PKI systems and 
how the blockchains can be used to resolve their problems. We 
further presented several proposed approaches providing 
blockchain-based PKI solutions. Furthermore, we discussed the 
IBC technique which is a recent popular technique in providing 
security services. We presented the traditional IBC, their 
problems, the blockchain-based IBC, and a proposed approach 
for a blockchain-based IBC. Table VI shows the comparisons 
among the discussed approaches from different perspectives. It 
should be noted that even though these systems exist and are 
open-source, only few are utilized in real-world applications. 
IV. PRIVACY SERVICES 
A privacy service offers the user the rights to control and set 
rules for its data and resources accessed by the network. In other 
words, it enables the data or resource owners to control the 
disclosure of their information. This is generally done by letting 
the user define his access control list (ACL). In this section, we 
investigate the requirements of providing the data privacy, its 
importance for the current applications, the traditional 
techniques for privacy, and the challenges currently faced in 
providing the privacy service efficiently. Then, we give an 
overview on how the blockchains can be used to provide 
privacy and summarize a few existing blockchain-based 
privacy providing systems. 
A. Data Privacy and ACL 
The data privacy requires that all personal and sensitive 
information remain confidential (not public) and access to them 
can be controlled by the data owners. The ACL assures that by 
defining a set of rules stating who can access a specific set of 
data and when. To illustrate the privacy problem, consider the 
users in organizations such as Facebook, Google, banks and 
government surveillance. Each user must provide his/her 
personal information. Thus, these organizations have a massive 
amount of personal data that should not be made public. 
Individuals have little or no control over the storage and the 
access to their information. Therefore, the data privacy can be 
violated. Many controversial incidents have been reported, 
especially with banks and government surveillance [48] [49]. 
The privacy concerns exist whenever the data is collected, 
stored, used, destroyed, or even deleted. In other words, privacy 
applies to the data in motion and at rest. Several federal laws 
have been developed to prevent information leakage; as an 
instance, the healthcare information privacy laws [50]. For all 
these reasons, privacy is a major concern for application and 
network developers. 
B. Importance of Privacy in Current Applications 
The data privacy is a prominent interest in the era of cloud 
computing and networking systems where many users share the 
same physical storage or network. Application developers 
migrate their storage and computations to the clouds and require 
the data privacy to be granted. Moreover, IoT, healthcare, smart 
TABLE VI 
BLOCKCHAIN-BASED PKI APPROACHES COMPARSION 
Approach Blockchain 
platform 
Modifies 
implementation? 
Public key generation Corresponding traditional approach Main utilized blockchain properties  
IKP Ethereum No By CA CA Distributed Database 
Pomcor Ethereum No By CA CA Distributed Database 
Gan’s [36] Their own Yes By CA and DMV CA Distributed Database 
DPKI - - By user WoT All 
Blockstack Namecoin 
(Bitcoin) 
No By user CA and WoT All 
Certcoin Namecoin 
(Bitcoin) 
Yes By user CA and WoT All 
Guardtime - - By user (PUF) CA and WoT Distributed Database 
[44] - - By user WoT Distributed Database 
[47] Namecoin 
(Bitcoin) 
Yes By user IBC All 
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grids, and several other popular networking applications need 
to process and store a massively large amount of data, generally 
using cloud computing. Privacy is a critical requirement for 
most of these applications that are involved with personal 
information or location knowledge. The problem of privacy is 
intesified in case of using multiple clouds and internetworking 
among them. 
C. Traditional Techniques for Data Privacy 
Generally, the data privacy can be provided by delegating the 
ACL definitions to the data owners and using encryption 
techniques to prevent others from accessing the data. Hence, the 
organizations who amass or process the data have no rights to 
access the if the ACL does not permit. Design and 
implementation techniques to provide the privacy service is 
among the most active research topics, and several techniques 
have been proposed so far. For example, homomorphic 
encryption, which allows the computation and the processing 
the encrypted data and returns encrypted results, is one way to 
provide the data privacy service [51]. 
Another privacy aspect, which is out of the scope of this 
paper, is hiding the user’s identity. Data anonymization and 
differential privacy mechanisms hide the identity of the user 
and make it difficult to link the data to its owner. For example, 
K-anonymity, a common way to anonymize the datasets, 
requires the sensitive information to be similar to at least K-1 
other records [52]. L-diversity, an extension of the K-
anonymity approach, guarantees that the sensitive information 
is stored in “diverse enough” possible locations [53]. T-
closeness is another approach that looks at the distribution of 
sensitive data [54]. Differential privacy uses data perturbation 
techniques or adds noise to them before sharing the data [55]. 
Most blockchain implementations provide pseudo-anonymous 
user privacy. For example, Bitcoin utilizes the hashes to 
identify the users, rather than their real names. The users stay 
hidden from others and remain anonymous to the system unless  
sophisticated attack actions are taken [1]. 
D. Problems with the Traditional Techniques 
Despite the fact that several research efforts exist, provide an 
efficient data privacy service is still challenging. Some of the 
challenges include efficiency, scalability, data ownership and 
lack of systematic data lifecycle approach. In the following, we 
briefly summarize these problems and refer the readers to [56] 
for more detailed discussion. 
• Efficiency and Scalability: Most of the data privacy 
techniques rely on complex cryptographic algorithms; hence, 
they are inefficient and difficult to scale with large 
applications. Recent research tries to reduce the complexity 
and enhance the efficiency of these cryptographic techniques 
[57]. However, the proposed approaches still lack 
practicality in most cases. Further, most algorithms fail to 
scale with the massive amount of data processing required in 
the current networks. 
• Data Ownership and Control: The questions of who owns 
the data and who can modify it are critical in privacy. The 
owner generally is the party that decides the access control 
rules for the data. Unfortunately, the traditional techniques 
discussed in the previous subsection still lack an answer to 
the ownership question. 
• Systematic Data Lifecycle Approach: A framework for the 
data privacy needs to be constructed to systematically define 
the lifecycle of the data. This framework should identify the 
phases, define their privacy requirements, and allow 
flexibility in the lifecycle changes. These phases can include 
the acquisition, the sharing and the deletion of the data and 
the resources involved in the system . However, a systematic 
approach is still missing in most of the proposed privacy 
techniques. 
E. Blockchain-Based Data Privacy Techniques 
The blockchain technology can be used to provide 
decentralized end-to-end data privacy guarantees that can 
resolve some of the problems discussed in the previous 
subsection. Specifically, it can provide the data ownership 
solutions and dynamically change the access rights when 
needed. However, since the blockchains depend on 
cryptographic techniques, the blockchain-based techniques are 
still complex. The problems associated with the traditional 
approaches and how the blockchain technology can solve them 
are presented in Table VII. 
TABLE VII 
TRADITIONAL DATA PRIVACY PROBLEMS AND BLOCKCHAIN-
BASED SOLUTIONS 
The traditional 
approach 
The problem The Blockchain solution  
ACL Definition 
and Monitoring 
in addition to 
encryption 
(Data Privacy) 
Efficiency No solution by the blockchains. The 
homomorphic encryption may be still 
used and thus the problem still exists. 
Scalability Generally, the blockchains scale better 
than the traditional approaches, 
however scalability is still a challenge 
in the blockchains, which will be 
discussed in Section VI  
Data 
ownership 
and control 
The blockchain technology can 
resolve the problem as it can record 
the ownership and the changes in the 
data. The user has full control to 
define its ACL. 
Systematic 
lifecycle 
The blockchain users can update their 
smart contract or establish new 
contracts easily and thus the changes 
can be flexible. However, they are still 
under user control. A programmable 
ACL should be written over the 
blockchains to make the approach 
systematic. 
Anonymity and 
Differential 
Privacy (User 
Privacy) 
Complexity Some blockchain platforms can 
provide a pseudo-anonymous user 
privacy. For example, Bitcoin utilizes 
the hashes to identify the users rather 
than usernames. The users are hidden 
from other nodes and remain 
anonymous to the system unless 
further actions are taken. Using this, 
the pseudo-anonymity is provided. 
The idea behind the ideal blockchain-based data privacy is to 
build a blockchain layer over the data storage layer, let the 
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owner define the desired ACL through smart contracts, and 
publish the ACL and the data to as the blockchain transactions 
(encrypted using sophisticated encryption techniques). In this 
way, organizations such as Facebook or Google will not own 
the data as happens in the traditional techniques. However, they 
will be a part of the blockchain network and they will be able 
to process the data only when the ACL allows them. This type 
of blockchains is called the permissioned blockchains. Policies 
to define the data access are either based on the smart contracts 
or on the data management messages. Further, an off-chain 
database can be used to store the encrypted data as the 
blockchain memory is limited and cannot store massive 
amounts of data. In the following, we discuss several recent 
approaches that utilize the blockchain technology to provide the 
privacy service. 
1) Zyskind ’s Approach 
Zyskind, Nathan, and Pentland, [20], propose a decentralized 
data privacy approach that ensures the users’ control over their 
data and uses the blockchain blocks to store the data and the 
ACL. As illustrated in Fig. 6, the system is composed of three 
main components: users, providers and the blockchain network. 
The users are nodes interested in downloading an application or 
using a service. Providers, who hold such services or 
applications, need to process the users’ personal data for 
operational and business purposes. The blockchain nodes are 
the untrusted entities that constitute the blockchain network and 
have a distributed data store (off-chain data store). The data is 
distributed and replicated among the data stores to ensure the 
privacy and the high availability services. 
 
Fig. 6: Zyskind’s proposed system components 
The blockchain network accepts two types of transactions: 
T access and T data. The T access is used for the control and the 
management operations on the data, such as defining the ACL 
and modifying the access rights. The T data is used for data 
storage and retrieval. The owner can change the permission and 
the access controls by sending a policy set in the T access 
transaction, which is checked for correctness by the blockchain 
nodes. Similarly, a user or a service provider can access the data 
by sending a T data transaction which will be approved by the 
blockchain nodes if the policies specified earlier are met. The 
returned response (access information or denial) is encrypted; 
hence, unauthorized users cannot have access the data. 
Zyskind ’s Approach is a research work that has been verified 
theoretically and practically in their paper [20]. However, the 
open-source implementation of the proposed approach is still 
missing thus, practicality and suitability of the proposed 
approach are still to be testified. 
2) Blockchain-Based Data Sharing (BBDS) 
Blockchain-based data sharing (BBDS) is another approach 
proposed to provide privacy for the medical records in a cloud 
environment [58]. It uses a simplified blockchain architecture 
that is scalable and efficient for lightweight communication 
systems. The system is composed of three layers: the user layer, 
the management layer, and the storage layer. In the following, 
we briefly explain the rules for each layer: 
• The user layer: The user layer includes the individuals or 
the organizations who want to access or store their data and 
services. 
• The management layer: The management layer includes 
issuers, verifiers, and consensus nodes. The issuers 
authenticate the users when they first come and handle their 
registrations. The verifiers authenticate the users later and 
manage their keys. The consensus nodes construct the 
blockchain network and process the new blocks the same 
way as in Bitcoin processing.  
• The storage layer: The storage layer includes cloud-based 
data storage and processing infrastructures to securely store 
and process the data. 
The block structure in the BBDS is simplified by modifying 
the transaction and block header fields to meet the healthcare 
records requirements. Furthermore, the interactions in the 
system are secured by identity-based authentication and 
encryption techniques which are simple, efficient, provably 
secure, and lightweight. 
BBDS is implemented in a private permissioned blockchain 
that does not rely on any of the open-source blockchains 
discussed earlier in Section II-D. The theoretical and the initial 
implementation of the proposed approach showed a good 
performance compared to Bitcoin complexity. However, the 
full system is under development and thus it is not yet popular 
at the time of this writing. 
3) FairAccess 
FairAccess utilizes the smart contracts to define the access 
control policies and make authorization decisions [59]. The 
system uses the blockchain transactions to define authorization 
tokens. These tokens are used by the sender to authorize the 
receiver in accessing parts of the sender’s data. Functions in 
FairAccess include: resource registration, grant access, request 
access and revoke access.  
This approach is not implemented in the paper; however, the 
theoretical analyses showed that the data privacy could be 
preserved by the provided integrity, authentication, encryption 
and consensus access control monitoring. 
4) Dynamic Access Control for IoT Using FairAccess 
FairAccess has been utilized to provide a distributed, 
secured, and adaptive ACL management for the IoT 
environments [60]. The proposed idea is to let the users register 
their new resources and define their access policies through the 
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smart contracts associated with these resources. The process of 
requesting a resource, as depicted in Fig. 7, involves several 
steps. First, when a request is made for a resource that is held 
by user A, it is directed to the blockchain network. In turn, the 
blockchain network allows/denies the access request based on 
the associated resource’s smart contract. The network sends a 
feedback to the requester granting or denying his access 
request. Further, the owner can update his/her access policy 
based on the received feedback from the blockchain network 
using deep reinforcement learning, an adaptive machine 
learning mechanism. 
 
Fig. 7: FairAccess resource request process 
This approach is implemented and testified for a specific IoT 
use-case. The implementation is done on top of Bitcoin and the 
results show the feasibility of the proposed approach in 
providing the right access control list management. However, 
the lack of real-time support, the block complexity and the 
inflexible implementation are still drawbacks that burden the 
practicality and the widespread of the proposed approach. 
5) Decentralized Runtime Access Monitoring System 
(DRAMS) 
In [61], the authors utilize the blockchain technology to 
verify access control logs for clouds in a federated cloud 
environment. The key idea is to use the smart contracts in 
defining the access rights and collecting the access logs from 
different clouds. The blockchain miners compare the access 
rights to the access logs. If a violation is detected, an alert is 
raised to be further handled by the system. 
This approach was implemented on top of the Ethereum 
platform. Results show that the system is resilient to many 
threats, including compromising the communication channel to 
modify the access rights, compromising the policy evaluation 
to allow unauthorized accesses, and compromising the logs to 
alter or delete them. However, latency, cost and scalability are 
the challenges that need to be considered for this platform to 
become practical. 
6) Data Privacy for IoT Data Storage and Sharing 
IoT is witnessing a rapid increase in the number of innovative 
applications; however, security is still a major concern. Most 
current ACL mechanisms are delegated to a trusted, centralized 
controller that maintains and manages the access controls. On 
the other hand, the blockchain-based data privacy can help 
resolve the problems with centralization and provide 
decentralized, resilient, and auditable privacy guarantees. In 
[62], the authors use the blockchain network to securely store 
and manage the access permissions. The blockchain 
transactions are composed of the ownership of the data and the 
corresponding access permissions. Initially, the owner submits 
a transaction that includes the data stream identifier. A new 
transaction is issued when the owner wants to share the data 
with other users or with the service providers. Further, the 
owner can revoke his data sharing by submitting a revoke 
transaction. When a provider or another user wants to retrieve 
a specific set of data, they send a request to the storage node 
which queries the blockchain network for the access rights. 
Data, in both the blockchain database and the storage nodes, is 
encrypted and highly distributed. This mitigates the threats of 
malicious storage nodes that grant service access rights without 
consulting the blockchain. 
An initial implementation of this scheme was built on top of 
the Bitcoin platform. Results showed a reasonable overhead due 
to the routing loads, the point-to-point communication and the 
distributed storage. However, the latency and the scalability 
challenges are not resolved, especially for real-time IoT 
applications.  
F. Summary and Comparisons 
The data privacy is a critical security aspect that guarantees 
the user’s control over their data disclosures and prevents 
unauthorized access and processing. In this section, we 
discussed several blockchain-based approaches providing the 
data privacy. Such approaches define the ACL either by the 
smart contracts or by special management transactions. 
Monitoring of the access rules and the violations can be done 
by the blockchain nodes to fully eliminate centralization. 
Table VIII compares the different discussed approaches. It 
should be noted that these approaches handle the data privacy 
rather than the user privacy. Most blockchain implementations 
provide a pseudo-anomalous user privacy using the hashes to 
identify the users rather than their actual names.  
TABLE VIII 
BLOCKCHAIN-BASED DATA PRIVACY APPROACHES 
COMPARISON 
Approach Blockchain 
platform 
Modifies 
implementa
tion 
Smart 
contract/ 
transactions 
Scalable 
solution 
Zyskind Ethereum 
(Enigma 
platform [59]) 
Yes Transactions No 
BBDS Bitcoin Yes Transaction Yes 
FairAccess Not 
implemented 
(Ethereum is 
planned) 
Yes 
(planned) 
Smart 
contract 
No 
FairAccess 
for IoT 
Not 
implemented 
Yes 
(planned) 
Smart 
Contract 
No 
DRAMS Ethereum No Smart 
contract 
No  
[62] Yes (Bitcoin) Yes Transactions Yes 
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V. PROVENANCE SERVICES 
Data or resource provenance is another security service that 
deals with the tractability and the auditability of the resources. 
In this section, we discuss the traditional techniques provide the 
data provenance and highlight their problems. Following that, 
we discuss how the blockchains can help in providing a 
provenance architecture, highlight some of the proposed 
approaches that utilize the blockchain technology to provide the 
data provenance services and give a brief comparison among 
the different discussed blockchain-based provenance 
approaches. 
A. Data and Resource Provenance 
Data provenance refers to the metadata that tracks and reports 
the originality of the data and the operations associated with 
them. The metadata includes records of the inputs, the entities, 
the systems, and the processes that accessed or manipulated the 
data of interest. An example would be the tracking of the data 
ownership and the accessing of some information in a cloud 
environment. When dealing with clouds, the data are massively 
scaled, and the resources are shared by many different entities. 
It is important to track the origin of the data and the operations 
happened on them, including the reading, the processing and 
the writing of the data or the resources. This is not only applied 
to the data, but also to any type of resources such as the network 
devices, the workflows, the web services, and the processes. 
Providing provenance guarantees resource tractability, 
forensic capabilities, and auditability. In other words, it helps 
the network administrators in detecting any access violation or 
any malicious operation. However, this service comes with two 
issues, complexity and privacy violation. Keeping track of the 
resources is challenging and complex, especially for the 
distributed applications. Data or resources can be replicated in 
different areas to provide availability and they might follow 
different paths to provide resilience guarantees. Furthermore, 
the amount of data is massively increasing, which makes 
tracking complex and inefficient. Further, such tracking may 
violate privacy if the information about the data ownership and 
the data originality is exposed. Due to this reason, guaranteeing 
the data provenance without violating the privacy is a challenge 
to be resolved in the current applications. 
B. Importance of Provenance 
In the age of social networking, cloud computing, IoT, and 
other distributed applications, data is an acute resource that is 
open and vulnerable to intrusions. The owners need to know not 
only the data originality, but also the manipulations and the 
accesses to the data along its lifecycle. For example, in IoT 
applications, the sensor data has to be tracked so that they get 
to the consumers without any unauthorized modification. 
Further, the consumers need to know how accurate the 
information is and what time it was sent. This can be achieved 
only by proper data provenance techniques. The same 
provenance requirements are applied to the healthcare data, the 
financial data, the governmental resource, or even scientific 
applications. Such applications are worldwide, generating 
massive amounts of data that need to be tracked. Hence, the 
provenance guarantees are crucial for these applications. 
C. The Traditional Techniques 
State-of-the-art techniques in providing the data provenance 
in the cloud environments are based on logging and auditing 
techniques. Most of these approaches are used at the centralized 
authority that manages the system resources. Examples of the 
data provenance approaches include PASS [63], S2Logger [64], 
and SPROVE [65]. PASS was one of the first approaches to 
provide the data provenance service by collecting and 
maintaining information about the operations done at the 
system level [63]. S2Logger is a tracking tool that provides an 
end-to-end resource monitoring in a cloud environment at the 
file level [64]. SPROVE is a technique that provides 
confidentiality and integrity of the data provenance through 
encryption and signature techniques [65]. In addition, in [66], 
the authors propose a secure data provenance technique that 
utilizes encryption techniques to enhance the privacy of the data 
provenance. 
D. Problems with the Traditional Techniques 
The techniques discussed in the previous subsection have 
several challenges, including ineffectiveness, complexity, lack 
of privacy and centralized controllers. The cloud hardware and 
software are distributed by nature and have several layers of 
interoperability, which makes the logging techniques 
inefficient. Tracking resources can be complex in nature as the 
cloud resources may move to provide load balancing and to 
ensure resilience. Further, employing security techniques like 
encryption and digital signature can add an additional level of 
complexity to the system. However, not having encryption and 
signature may break the data privacy if the data’s origin and the 
data ownership are exposed to a third party. Finally, to store the 
logging information or to monitor the data in a system, a 
centralized controller is needed, which requires a trusted third 
party that is complex, expensive and a single point of failure. 
E. Blockchain-Based Data Provenance 
The blockchain technology can be viewed as a shared 
immutable ledger that record the events in the system. Thus, it 
is a potential approach to provide the data provenance service 
by recording the evidence of the data originality and the 
operations in the blockchain transactions. However, the 
integrity and the confidentiality of the blocks should be granted 
by any blockchain-based data provenance. The problems with 
the traditional approaches and how the blockchains can resolve 
them are presented in Table IX. 
In the following, we discuss several approaches that utilize 
the blockchains to provide the data provenance service. Further, 
we discuss some other supply chain provenance approaches and 
how they can be applied to provide the data provenance service. 
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TABLE IX 
TRADITIONAL DATA PROVENANCE PROBLEMS AND 
BLOCKCHAIN-BASED SOLUTIONS 
 
The traditional 
approach 
The problem Blockchain solution 
Any centralized 
data provenance 
technique (PASS, 
S2Logger, ...) 
Ineffectiveness The distributed nature and 
the event recording 
properties of the 
blockchains can resolve the 
problem  
Complexity  It is delegated to the 
blockchain network and 
distributed among the 
nodes 
Data privacy The sophisticated 
encryption techniques in 
the blockchains can help. 
However, the verification, 
in this case, would be 
difficult 
Centralized 
controller 
No centralized controller is 
involved 
1) ProvChain 
ProvChain is a blockchain-based data provenance system 
that offloads encrypted provenance records to the blockchain 
database in the form of transactions [67]. It utilizes the 
blockchain database as a distributed database that provides the 
integrity and non-reputability guarantees. The validation of the 
data provenance is done off-chain by a centralized provenance 
auditor (PA). The system consists of five components: users, 
cloud service providers, blockchain network, provenance 
database, and the PA. The users are the resource owners or the 
data accessors. The providers offer storage services and are 
responsible for the users’ registration. The blockchain network 
consists of nodes that participate in the system and keep the data 
provenance records in the blocks. The provenance database 
records all the provenance data on the blockchain network and 
locally at the cloud level. Finally, the auditor retrieves the 
provenance data from the blockchain database and validates the 
blockchain receipt. The interactions among the various system 
components are depicted in Fig. 8. 
 
Fig. 8: ProvChain system interactions 
ProvChain has been implemented and evaluated in [67]. The 
results demonstrated the feasibility of the proposed approach 
and the ability to supply all the security features provides by the 
blockchains. ProvChain utilizes a blockchain database to store 
the data provenance records. However, the verification of the 
operations and the records is done locally outside the 
blockchain network, at a centralized PA. In other words, 
ProvChain does not utilize the consensus property of the 
blockchain technology. 
2) DataProv 
DataProv is another platform that uses the blockchain 
technology and the smart contracts to provide data provenance 
services for the sensitive cloud information [68]. It is built on 
top of the Ethereum platform and uses an off-chain JavaScript 
module to interact with the users. There are two types of smart 
contracts: Document_Track and Vote. A Document_Track 
contract is an Ethereum smart contract and is initiated for each 
document in the system. The documents can be shared data or 
any type of assets shared by the system. The Document_Track 
contract includes functions such as add a document, grant a user 
access, revoke an access, and track the changes in the 
document. The Vote contract records the miners’ votes and 
includes functions such as initiate a vote, record a vote and 
terminate a process. An overview of the system architecture is 
illustrated in Fig. 9. Initially, the user submits any changes in 
the data to the blockchain network and submits a vote contract. 
The blockchain network asks the miners, or the voters, of the 
system to verify the changes and to report back. The voting is 
done based on the majority votes from the miners involved and 
the votes are recorded for each change. At the end of the voting 
phase, the changes to the document are either accepted or 
rejected. If the changes are accepted by the voters, then the 
Document_Track contract is updated, and the changes are 
submitted to the cloud provider. Otherwise, the changes are 
rejected after some time and the cloud provider will be notified 
to take further actions. 
 
Fig. 9: DataProv architecture 
DataProv has been implemented on top of the Ethereum 
blockchain platform. Drug trials and wheat production are the 
specific use-cases used to evaluate the system. The evaluation 
is done on real-life scenarios and shows the feasibility of the 
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proposed approach in providing provenance guarantees with 
low cost and moderate overhead.  
3) A Blockchain-Based Approach for Data Accountability 
and Provenance Tracking 
In [69], Neisse et al. propose a blockchain-based approach 
for the data accountability and the provenance tracking. Similar 
to DataProv, this approach uses the smart contracts in the public 
blockchains to define the access rules for the data. This system 
is composed of three main actors: data subjects, data 
controllers, and data processors. Data subjects are the owners 
of the data and they authorize the data controllers to access the 
data. Meanwhile, data processors are the organizations that are 
authorized to process the data on behalf of the controllers. This 
approach defines three types of smart contracts that can be 
summarized as follows:  
• The data subject contract for specific controllers: The 
owner of the data creates a contract for each specific 
controller that has all or portions of the data. This contract 
tracks the data shared with the controller, the access rights and 
the operations performed by the controller on the data. Hence, 
this contract provides the provenance service of the data 
shared with that specific controller. 
• The data subject contract for specific data: The owner 
defines the rules and the access rights of a set of data that is 
accessed by any controller in a smart contract. This contract 
tracks a specific data shared with any controller and the logs 
associated with operations performed on that data. In other 
words, it provides provenance for a specific data or a set of 
data that can be shared with any controller. 
• The data controller contract for data subjects: The 
controller creates a contract for any owner that wants to share 
the same data with it. This contract defines how the data 
received from the data subjects are treated by the controller. 
It is used by the subjects, or the owners of the data, to help 
decide data sharing rules with that controller. Further, the 
contract logs the creation and ownership of the data, which is 
also a part of the data provenance guarantees. 
These contracts provide both privacy and provenance for the 
data shared with the clouds, the grids or even the services shared 
with others. Thus, the approach can be used for any security 
service; For example, sharing the patient’s personal information 
in a smart healthcare system. 
Initial implementation showed the feasibility and practicality 
of the proposed approach in providing provenance and privacy. 
However, the implementation also showed scalability and 
performance limitations due to the blockchain’s complexity. 
4) Provenance (An Enterprise Project) 
Provenance is an enterprise project that offers a blockchain-
based tracking of physical items or resources in a supply chain 
[70]. It associates every physical product with a digital identity 
to provide the traceability and the transparency for that product. 
The idea is to have the producers register their products to the 
blockchain system with certifications or tags. Then, the 
blockchain network tracks the changes made to that product. An 
event is recorded to the blockchain each time a change is made, 
or a product reaches a certain stage in its lifecycle. In this way, 
the products can be traced when shipped from the producers to 
the consumers.  
Use-cases showed the feasibility of the Provenance’s 
approach to track commercial products such as foods or goods. 
Even though Provenance’s technique strictly applies to the 
physical products, it can be extended to audit and risk 
management of the data in enterprises. For example, it is 
possible to track the data in the cloud when they move from the 
data center to the user or vice versa. In this case, Provenance 
can provide a solution by letting the user register the data in the 
blockchain, where the tracking, the recording and the validation 
of the data can happen. 
5) IBM Supply Chain 
Similar to Provenance, IBM provides their own blockchain-
based supply chain tracking using the Hyperledger blockchain 
platform. The concept is similar to other blockchain-based data 
provenance, whereas any change or any operation done on the 
data is logged to the blockchain database in transactions. IBM 
use-cases are also dedicated to tracking physical products; 
however, they can be extended to digital applications easily 
[71]. 
6) Other Blockchain-Based Supply Chain 
Even though IBM and Provenance are the most popular 
blockchain-based supply chains, there exist some other 
approaches that do the same. These approaches mostly care 
about the physical products and other goods provenance, but 
their approach can be applied to the data and the digital 
resources, as in Provenance. BlockVerify is a startup that tracks 
counterfeit products to detect frauds. Their main use-cases 
include the pharmaceutical industry, luxury products, 
diamonds, and electronics [72]. Ambrosus is a startup company 
that provides supply chain provenance, mainly for the food 
products and medicines [73]. Moreover, EverLedger is another 
startup company that provides provenance guarantees for 
digital and physical products using a similar concept [72]. 
F. Summary and Comparisons 
With the amount of data that are being processed in the 
current applications, it is critical to know and understand the 
data originality, validity, and timing. Data provenance is one 
way to provide that by tracking the data ownerships and 
recording the changes. Provenance is critical for current 
applications’ auditing and the detection of security violations. 
The traditional techniques are mostly inefficient, complex, 
centralized, and have no specific protection for sensitive 
information. In this section, we discussed blockchain-based 
data provenance and described several approaches to achieve 
the data provenance with the blockchains. Further, the 
blockchain-based supply chain provenance can be modified to 
provide data provenance in multi-cloud environments. Table X 
compares these approaches.  
The complexity of the communication in DataProv and the 
centralized PA in ProvChain show that the blockchain-based 
data provenance needs more research effort and can be further 
enhanced by proper utilization of the smart contracts. 
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VI. INTEGRITY ASSURANCE SERVICE 
Integrity assures that the data has not been modified or 
altered when at rest or in motion. In this section, we discuss the 
integrity service, its importance for the current applications, its 
traditional techniques, and the challenges associated with them. 
Then we highlight how the blockchain technology can help in 
the integrity verification and discuss some of the proposed 
blockchain-based integrity assurance platforms. 
A. Integrity Assurance 
Integrity assurance deals with the correctness and the validity 
of the data stored, accessed, or generated by the network. It 
assures that the information has not been changed or corrupted 
by unauthorized users. This should be applied to the 
information in motion or at rest. In other words, when the data 
is stored in the cloud, generated by a sensor, or is transmitted to 
a client, it should not be altered by an unauthorized user. 
Providing an end-to-end integrity assurance maintains 
consistency, reliability, accuracy, and trustworthiness of the 
information over its entire lifecycle. The integrity is one of the 
basic components of the CIA (confidentiality, integrity and 
availability) triad for information security [74]. Further, it is a 
required service by any interconnection system, as was 
discussed in Section I-B [15]. Therefore, guaranteeing the 
integrity service has been investigated for several decades. In 
most cases, integrity is ensured by proper signatures and public 
key cryptographic techniques [28]. However, how to define and 
trust a third-party authority to verify the integrity is a challenge, 
especially in the current distributed networks. 
B. Integrity’s Importance for The Current Applications 
Current applications deal with massive amounts of remote 
communications that involve many actors, multiple 
intermediate devices, and several domains. This makes the data, 
the users, and the information inextricably linked to the 
cyberspace and vulnerable to many attacks. Attacks include 
data thefts and alterations, which might threaten human lives. 
For example, in the smart healthcare system, altering the 
patients’ information can result in serious consequences, if the 
sensor data is altered by intruders. The same threat can target 
the IoT platforms, the smart home environments, or the 
intelligent transportation systems. Thus, it is critical to provide 
integrity for the information shared by the network. Further, it 
is important to know the source of the alteration and react to the 
changes as quickly as possible. 
C. Traditional Integrity Assurance Techniques 
Data integrity is commonly assured using cryptographic 
tools and data replications. Cryptographic tools such as the 
public key cryptography or the keyless signature infrastructure 
(KSI) are used to sign the data or the resources so that an 
unauthorized person cannot change them. Any change in the 
data will be detected by the signature validation techniques. The 
process is similar to entity authentication which was explained 
in Section III-A. Attacks on such techniques require the attacker 
to know the secret key in order to sign the data. Finding the 
secret key is challenging, but once realized, the attack becomes 
practically unpredictable. Replications can also protect against 
the data integrity violations. In this technique, the attacker 
needs to modify all the replicas, which can be distributed over 
several nodes in a randomized fashion. Thus, combining both 
the replication techniques and the cryptographic tools can 
provide the system with a strong a data integrity assurance. 
These are commonly used nowadays in the cloud environments 
[75]. 
D. Problems with the Traditional Techniques 
One of the most critical problems with the previously 
discussed techniques is not in verifying the integrity but is in 
tracking the intruder who tampered the data. It is not feasible in 
practice to find the intruder as the tampering could be done at 
the storage phase, at the processing phase, or at the 
communication phase. However, knowing the intruders can 
help in detecting malicious behaviors, changing the access 
control mechanisms and, in some cases, penalizing these 
intruders. In addition, the validation of the data is currently 
done by a trusted party, which imposes a security risk of trust 
and a single point of failure. Further, integrity is normally an 
additional security service which adds work, resources, and 
complexity to the system. 
E. Blockchain-Based Integrity Assurance 
Blockchain-based architectures are potential approaches to 
solve the problems discussed in the previous subsection. The 
problems with the traditional approaches and how the 
blockchains can resolve them are illustrated in Table XI.  
TABLE X 
BLOCKCHAIN-BASED DATA PROVENANCE APPROACHES  
COMPARISON 
Approach Blockchain 
platform 
Modifies 
implementation? 
Data or physical 
supply chain 
ProvChain Bitcoin No Data – single 
cloud  
DataProv Ethereum No Data - multiple 
clouds 
Neisse [69] Their own Yes Data- any type of 
data sharing 
Provenance Ethereum 
(mostly but 
not stated) 
No Physical supply 
chain mostly- 
discussed 
Auditing and 
management of 
data for 
enterprises  
IBM-Supply 
Chain 
Hyperledger No Physical supply 
chain but can be 
extended to 
multiple clouds 
BlockVerify Their own Yes Physical supply 
chain 
Ambrosus Ethereum No Physical supply 
chain 
EverLedger Their own Yes Both physical and 
digital supply 
chain 
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TABLE XI 
PROBLEMS WITH THE TRADITIONAL INTEGRITY 
TECHNIQUES AND BLOCKCHAIN-BASED SOLUTIONS 
The traditional 
approach 
The problem The blockchain solution  
Cryptography 
and Replication 
Techniques 
No Tracking The blockchains can be 
used to save data changes, 
thus, they provide the 
evidence to the latest 
changes (as discussed in 
data provenance section) 
Integrity is an 
additional service 
The blockchains include 
the transaction integrity 
check by design, thus, the 
integrity is not an added 
service. 
Outsider tampering The blockchain database 
cannot be tampered  
The blockchains have embedded integrity checks as 
transactions are signed by the sender and verified by the miners. 
The data cannot be tampered if it is committed to the blockchain 
database as discussed before. Thus, the use of the blockchain 
transactions to submit the data or any asset guarantees the 
integrity service. Moreover, the blockchain technology can be 
used to provide evidence for when the data has changed as 
discussed previously in Section V on the data provenance. In 
the following, we discuss several integrity techniques using the 
blockchain technology. 
1) Blockchain-Based Data Integrity Service Framework for 
IoT Data 
In [76], the authors propose a blockchain-based data integrity 
framework that uses the smart contracts to achieve its 
objectives. This framework is dedicated to IoT applications that 
require a producer-consumer architecture. In this architecture, 
the owner shares the data with other consumers for specific 
purposes. The data is generally shared through the use of the 
cloud storage services, where the owner posts the data to the 
cloud and the consumers access the data from there. As 
discussed in the previous subsection, storing the data in the 
blockchain database provides the integrity service. However, 
the blockchain database are limited in memory and cannot 
handle the massive amounts of data. Thus, storing all the cloud 
data becomes impractical. 
The idea of this framework is to store encrypted hash values 
of the data on the blockchain database and these hash values are 
then used to check the integrity. The owner generates the hash 
value of the data, encrypts the hash value and sends it to the 
blockchain network as a smart contract or a transaction. Further, 
the owner posts the data to the cloud and allows other users to 
access it. The procedure of the integrity assurance is as follows. 
First, the owner or the consumer requests the cloud storage to 
provide the data stored in the cloud. The consumer calculates 
the hash value of the retrieved data. Alternatively, the owner 
could ask for the hash value directly from the cloud if the cloud 
is capable of doing hash calculations. Then, the owner or the 
consumer consults the network for the hash value of the same 
data. If the hash values from the cloud and the blockchain 
response match, the data is valid, otherwise, it is not valid. 
This approach has been implemented on a private 
blockchain. The initial results showed that this technique can 
support the integrity verification efficiently in a small-scale 
network. However, as it can be seen, the proposed framework 
uses the blockchain technology as a distributed database and it 
does not make use of the most appealing blockchain 
characteristics. Furthermore, the consumer could be an IoT 
device which generally lacks the required computational power 
and might be unable to perform all the required computations. 
A better approach would delegate the construction and the 
validation of the hash values to the blockchain network, which 
is consulted for the validity of the data. 
2) Storj 
Storj is a blockchain-based peer to peer data storage system 
that utilizes the blockchain database to store hash values of the 
data and verify the integrity. The blockchain technology is 
immutable and provides integrity checks by design. Thus, any 
storage system that utilizes the blockchain transactions to store 
the data can provide the integrity service. The data can be stored 
in the blockchain transactions or off-chain by storing some 
metadata in the transactions and the data itself in the off-chain 
storages. In Storj, the data is stored off-chain while the metadata 
referring to the original data is stored in the transactions. The 
metadata has the location of the data and the hash of the data. 
Whenever the user wants to access the data, it inquires the 
blockchain network. The network validates the data stored off-
chain and returns back the metadata needed to retrieve the 
original data. In this way, the integrity is provided efficiently; 
however, the requirement of tracking the intruders in case the 
data is changed is still not provided [9]. 
Storj is an open-source implementation that allows secured 
and integrity-guaranteed data storage in distributed 
applications. It has been verified and tested by many real-case 
scenarios. To the best of our knowledge, Storj is the first 
blockchain-based cloud storage that is currently used by some 
enterprises. 
3) Ericsson Blockchain-Based Integrity Assurance 
Ericsson partnered with Guardtime to provide integrity 
services that allow the application developers to assure the 
integrity of their users’ data and assets. They utilize Keyless 
Signature Infrastructure (KSI) to generate signatures for the 
resources [77]. KSI is a signature technique proposed in 2006 
exploiting hash trees and timestamps to construct a signature 
for multiple documents. However, the original proposal relied 
on a central authority to construct the tree and give the 
signatures. Guardtime provides a blockchain-based KSI 
approach which is scalable, decentralized, efficient and 
provably secure. The Guardtime solution can be used for the 
authentication as it was discussed in Section III or for the 
integrity assurance. Ericsson utilizes Guardtime to provide the 
integrity rather than the authentication. The basic objective is to 
verify that a collection of the data generated by an application 
has not been modified. The functions provided by the service 
include generating a non-invertible signature for the user’s data, 
extending the signature or publicizing it, and verifying the 
integrity of the users’ data [78]. 
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The Ericsson service involves two simple steps: signing the 
data and verifying the signature. The signature of the data is 
recognized by submitting them to the blockchain, where the 
signature is simply sent back to the user. The signature is stored 
in the blockchain transactions as well as at the user’s system. 
To verify the data, the stored signature is submitted to the 
blockchain network for verification purposes. The blockchain 
nodes will validate the signature and return the expected hash 
value if the signature is valid. The user compares its hash value 
with the submitted one to determine whether the data was 
modified [79]. 
This service is provided as an open-source software 
development kit used by the application developers. It is 
currently used in Ericsson cloud solution to provide immutable 
evidence for the data stored in their clouds. This service is 
expected to get more popular and adopted by other cloud 
providers to provide a blockchain-based integrity assurance. 
F. Summary 
Data integrity assures that the data stored or transferred has 
not been tampered. It is normally done by the cryptographic 
signature combined with the verification techniques. In this 
section, we discussed the data integrity assurance using the 
blockchain technology and highlighted some blockchain-based 
integrity assurance approaches. The blockchain technology by 
itself can provide integrity assurance through non-repudiation 
guarantees. Table XII compares the different approaches from 
several perspectives. The Ericsson service verifies that a 
collection of data has not been altered by storing their signature 
on a blockchain. 
TABLE XII 
BLOCKCHAIN-BASED INTEGRITY ASSURANCE APPROACHES 
COMPARISON 
Approach Blockchain 
platform 
Used cryptographic 
approach 
Can verify multiple 
chunks 
Liu [76] Private 
blockchain 
PKI No 
Storj Florincoin 
[80] 
PKI No 
Ericson Guardtime KSI Yes 
It should be noted that none of the proposed approaches 
guarantees tracking the intruders if the data has been changed. 
Combining the proposed approaches with the data provenance 
approaches discussed earlier can provide tracking of the data; 
thus, it can detect who was the last changing the data. 
VII. BLOCKCHAIN CHALLENGES 
Despite the potential benefits of the blockchain technology, 
it still has some challenges that limit its practicality for the 
security applications discussed in the previous sections. In this 
section, we highlight some of these challenges and relate them 
to the security applications studied in this paper. 
A. Privacy and Anonymity 
One of the blockchain’s main properties and advantages is 
providing pseudo-user anonymity. This is critical for security 
as the public blockchains are open and the user information 
would be exposed to attackers. However, for most of the 
discussed approaches, the transactions relate the user identity to 
their public key, the ACL, or the provenance data. For example, 
the blockchain-based ACL mechanisms relate the ACL to the 
users directly; therefore, the users are no longer anonymous. 
The same issue is applied to the blockchain-based key 
management and blockchain-based provenance. That is, the 
privacy and the anonymity features of the blockchains are 
flawn. Bitcoin resolves the anonymity problem by using the 
user’s public key as the user identification. However, this 
provides pseudo-anonymity and further research is needed to 
provide fully anonymized approaches that meet the security 
application requirements. 
B. Computations and Mining Nodes 
In most of the current applications, the nodes are simple and 
do not have high computational capabilities. That is, the 
blockchain clients need to be simple in order to satisfy the low 
computation capability requirements. On the other hand, the 
security services, in general, require significant computations in 
encryption, decryption, and signature. Moreover, as discussed 
in Section II, the blockchain technology needs to have mining 
nodes with high computational power. For most of the proposed 
techniques, the mining challenge would be resolved by 
allowing the application nodes to be the blockchain clients and 
by introducing dedicated mining nodes that are added just to 
perform mining. However, the high computational power 
required for these nodes adds to the cost of the system. A better 
approach would include reducing the computational needs for 
the mining and relating the mining powers to the node 
trustworthiness or its reputation in the system. Further, simpler 
cryptographic schemes can be developed to reduce the 
computational needs for signing and encrypting the data. 
C. Communication Overhead 
Current applications are highly dynamic; therefore, they 
require frequent changes in the access lists and the provenance 
data. This forces the nodes to send frequent transactions to 
update the ACL or modify the provenance information. On the 
other hand, the blockchain technology is a peer-to-peer 
network, which indicates that a significant overhead will be 
added in terms of the network traffic and the system processing 
capabilities. The transactions and the blocks need to be 
broadcast as opposed to unicast in the traditional techniques. 
Thus, the overhead added to the network is significant and a 
considerable challenge. The storage and the processing 
overhead bring additional challenges in adopting the 
blockchains for security applications. 
D. Scalability 
The blockchain technology is believed to scale better than the 
traditional centralized techniques. However, as reported in [81], 
the technology performs poorly as the number of users and 
networking nodes increases [81]. This is a major challenge, 
especially with network security applications, where thousands 
of users need to be served and the network scales up fast. 
Furthermore, the dynamicity of the system adds to the scaling 
problem as the nodes need to frequently send update 
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transactions. The Ethereum platform and the Hyperledger 
platform have their own promises for scalability. However, the 
performance tests done in [24] show that both platforms still 
suffer from some aspects of scalability issues. 
E. Time Consumption 
Providing security services requires fast processing 
capabilities, especially in the current networks, where 
milliseconds can cost billions of dollars. Further, mining and 
achieving consensus are still time-consuming in the 
blockchains. The proposed approaches resolve the problem by 
making decisions from the local blockchain logs without 
requiring distributed consensus. For example, in the 
blockchain-based ACL mechanisms, the access decisions are 
made based on the local copies of the blockchain database. 
However, this defeats the technology decentralized architecture 
and its consensus as the nodes need to trust the local blockchain 
database and make centralized decisions. Many promises have 
been made to resolve Bitcoin’s time issues in Ethereum and 
Hyperledger platforms. However, the time required for mining 
is still two or three seconds as compared to the milliseconds 
requirement. Furthermore, building encryptions and security 
techniques over the blockchains exacerbates the problem of 
time complexity since such techniques are complex and time-
consuming. Thus, faster mining and processing techniques are 
needed to be able to employ the blockchains for real-time 
applications. 
F. Summary 
The popularity of the blockchain technology in several 
nonfinancial applications raised multiple challenges that we 
discussed in this section. The discussed challenges are related 
to providing security services and meeting the requirements of 
the current applications. These challenges include privacy and 
anonymity, computations and mining nodes, communication 
overhead, scalability, and time consumption. Privacy and 
scalability are the most difficult challenges, since they are 
related to the blockchain-based security applications. A balance 
between the technology potentials and the its challenges should 
be considered for efficient designs and solutions. Table XIII 
summarizes the blockchain-based security application 
challenges. Till now, the blockchain technology does not seem 
to be a potential candidate for real-time and delay-sensitive 
applications. Thus, the future research should tackle these 
challenges for a practical and widespread use of the blockchain-
based security applications. 
I. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we presented a comprehensive survey on the 
utilization of the blockchain technology in providing distributed 
security services. These services include entity authentication, 
confidentiality, privacy, provenance, and integrity assurances. 
The entity authentication and the confidentiality can be 
achieved by the public key cryptography using encryption and 
the signature schemes. Thus, we discussed different 
blockchain-based key management for public key 
cryptography. Further, privacy, provenance, and integrity 
assurance services were studied each in separate sections. 
TABLE XIII 
BLOCKCHAIN-BASED SECURITY APPLICATION CHALLENGES 
AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
The challenge The problem Effect on security for 
current applications 
Privacy and 
anonymity 
Most of the proposed 
approaches relate the 
user identity to the 
user information. For 
example, a user and 
its access control list. 
Breaks user anonymity 
since the user information 
is exposed and it is 
possible to relate the user 
identity to their 
information. 
Computations and 
mining nodes 
Signature, 
encryption and 
mining require high 
computational power 
which is not feasible 
with the resource 
limited application. 
Most of the current 
application are resource 
limited, thus, the 
proposed security 
management is not 
feasible without adding 
extra nodes for mining 
and simplifying the 
signature schemes. 
Communication 
overhead 
The blockchain 
network is a peer-to-
peer network which 
imposes high 
overhead in term 
network traffic and 
processing. 
As current applications 
are highly dynamic, the 
ACL and the data 
provenance frequently 
change. This indicates 
that the nodes will be 
sending lots of update 
transactions which will 
magnify the overhead 
even more. 
Scalability Bitcoin, Hyperledger 
and Ethereum have 
scalability issues as 
was indicated by 
[81]. 
Most of the proposed 
approaches were applied 
to limited scale networks. 
Testing them to real 
applications could be a 
challenge, especially for 
the blockchain-based 
ACL and the blockchain-
based provenance. 
Time consumption The time required to 
do mining and reach 
consensus could be 
high especially for 
real-time 
applications. 
The security applications 
need fast processing 
capabilities especially for 
the current resource 
constraint applications. 
We summarized on the properties that make the blockchain 
technology a potential candidate for several distributed 
applications. Then, we defined each service, discussed its rules 
in the current networking applications, highlighted the 
traditional approaches achieving the required service along with 
their challenges. Finally, we explained how the blockchains can 
help resolve these problems; explored different blockchain-
based approaches and presented a comparison of such 
approaches. At the end, we studied the challenges that are 
currently restricting the blockchain’s practicality for security 
applications. The blockchain technology seems to have a great 
potential in many applications; however, its practicality in 
security applications is still questionable due to several 
challenges. Future research directions include resolving these 
challenges and testing the different blockchain approaches in 
large scale and real-time environments. 
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